Temporary Entrustment Agreement
D. If, at the time of introduction, the supplier is aware that the intermediation is beyond 90 days, the supplier requests approval of the appointment contract from the local youth court and the national court within 30 days of intermediation. At the time of the hearing in question, DSS was in custody in accordance with the delegation agreements signed by the aunt. Because the agreements were not valid, these agreements did not determine custody of the DSS children and the court was unable to restore custody of DSS simply on the basis of those agreements. We reiterate the Tribunal`s rejection of the application for parental rights, but we do so for a variety of reasons. We are too available to the case when it was established, as a result of the facts of this case, that at the time of the hearing, during which the appointment agreements were signed by the aunt and approved by the J-DR court, legal advice was required for the parents, as none of the parents could be subjected to “loss of residual rights and obligations” at the time of this oral hearing. See. Code 16.1-266 (C). The care plan, submitted at the same time for DSS approval, was identified as a “return home” objective and not to end the rights and obligations of parents. On that date, no application to terminate parental rights has been made or pending. In the absence of such a petition, the parents` other rights could not be terminated.
See Code 16.1-283 (with requirements for termination of other parental rights); Stanley v. Abt. soc`l Serv`s, 10 Va.App. 596, 601-02, 395 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1990) (“[b]e. a person`s remaining parental rights may be terminated, a separate procedure must be implemented after a petition specifically requesting such a discharge” (underlining the added mention), aff`d, 242 Va. 60, 405 S.E.2d 621 (1991). The applicants` parental rights were not jeopardized until after the oral proceedings. The subsequent request to terminate these rights was based on the subsequent conduct of the applicants. In conclusion, the loss of their parental rights was neither expected nor possible at the hearing at which the delegation agreements were signed and submitted for tribunal approval. The questions in these consolidated appeals stem from a decision of the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg, which rejects a petition from the Fredericksburg Department of Social Services (DSS) to terminate the parental rights of Clyde Brown (“father”) and Joyce Williams (“mother”), parents of four minor children.
The DSS`s application was denied on the grounds that: That Code 16.1-266 (C) pre-arranged the appointment of a lawyer for the parents prior to the hearing at Fredericksburg Juvenile and Domestic Relations (“J-DR”) Court, in which the J-DR Court authorized the custody transfer agreements of the children`s aunt, Nancy Conway (“Aunt”), on DSS. DSS is appealing this decision. The parents appeal the finding of the District Court that the delegation agreements concluded exclusively by the aunt as well as the judicial conservatory custody with DSS are valid at the end of the de novo appeal. For the following reasons, we partially confirm and reverse the decision of the District Court.